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I.  Introduction 
This paper considers two important issues facing the EU candidate countries in the 
run-up to EMU membership. The first issue is the choice of exchange rate regime in 
the period prior to EMU membership. The second issue is the timing of the transition 
from an independent monetary policy regime to one governed by the European 
Central Bank. In this study we focus on the fundamental choice between adopting a 
fixed exchange rate regime, as in Estonia, or a floating exchange rate regime, as 
adopted in Poland. In practice, most of the accession candidates have adopted 
something between these two extremes, in the form of a managed float. The 
undoubted benefits from a currency union, and from the reduction in exchange rate 
uncertainty have to be set off against the loss of flexibility and any impact of a 
transitional overvaluation if a fixed rate or EMU membership is chosen. We discuss 
these issues below, and many of them are addressed in Barrell (2002) and Pain 
(2002).  
In this study, we consider five EU accession countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. The exchange rate in each of the five economies is 
closely tied to the euro, either formally or through strong trade linkages. A fixed 
nominal exchange rate provides stability to exporters and importers and can help to 
anchor domestic inflation e xpectations in tradable sectors. This is particularly 
important for small, open economies such as Estonia, where trade amounted to over 
200 per cent of GDP in 2000. It may be of less importance to a large economy such as 
Poland. A credible fixed exchange rate regime also reduces the risk premium imposed 
on domestic financial assets.  This may be particularly important for countries with a 
significant interest rate differential relative to the Euro Area, such as Poland, but is   2 
less relevant for the Czech Republic where interest rates have already converged on 
those in the Euro Area. A fixed exchange rate also means losing monetary or 
exchange rate policy to cushion the economy against shocks. This may be particularly 
important where fiscal policy is restrained by a deficit that exceeds the Maastricht 
criteria limit of 3 per cent of GDP, such as in Poland or the Czech Republic. It may be 
less relevant for Estonia or Slovenia, where the fiscal position is close to balance. 
Under each exchange rate regime, there must be an exit strategy to EMU. The exit 
strategy must consider both the timing of membership and the appropriate rate at 
which to fix the currency to the euro. The timing will depend on the ability of each 
economy to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria on exchange rate stability, 
inflation, interest rates and the fiscal position. The joining rate must be agreed with 
the Eurosystem of existing Member States. This rate will partly depend upon the 
timing of membership if a flexible exchange rate is adopted prior to EMU entry, as it 
should reflect the prevailing market rate at the time of entry.  
There are fundamental issues that any exchange rate arrangement needs to handle. It 
is generally assumed that the real exchange rate will appreciate in all the candidate 
countries during the accession period, due to both rapid productivity growth and 
nominal price convergence. During a period of convergence of productivity on 
European Union levels faster productivity growth in more open sectors pushes wages 
up across the economy as a whole. This puts upward pressure on prices in the non-
tradable sectors and hence observed inflation is higher the more rapid is productivity 
convergence. (This is the Balassa-Samuelson effect of productivity on the real 
exchange rate). The real appreciation associated with productivity can be seen as an 
equilibrium path, but the case for a real appreciation can also be supported on the   3 
basis of disparities in Purchasing Power Parity that have to be removed to produce an 
equilibrium. The price of homogeneous goods, including transport costs, should be 
constant across countries. At an aggregate level, consumer price differentials can 
persist on a permanent basis between countries, reflecting permanent differences in 
the quality or variety of goods and services consumed. But assuming a minimal level 
of convergence towards the quality and variety of goods in the EU, prices in the 
transition economies should converge towards EU levels, implying a positive inflation 
differential when measured in a common currency. The anticipated developments in 
real exchange rates will play an important role in the results of this study, and are 
discussed further in the next section of this paper.  
The analysis in this paper is undertaken using a global econometric macro-model, 
NiGEM, and the model is discussed in Section 4 below. The model used here has 
fully integrated descriptions of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and 
Slovenia. Model properties depend at least as much on the underlying structure of 
openness and of assets and liabilities as they do on the parameters. The economies we 
discuss here differ in important ways, as can be seen from Table 1 below, and we 
discuss the importance of these differences as we analyse policy choices. Poland is the 
least open, and Estonia is the most open. The latter country has the lowest stock of net 
financial wealth as a percent of GDP, and Hungary has the highest. This in part 
reflects the relative significance of public sector debt in these economies, and also the 
importance of bank deposits and equity market holdings. Differences in the 
privatisation process will have affected the stock of financial wealth in these 
countries.    4 
Table 1  Key data ratios 
  Per cent 









Czech Republic  16.4  170.0  -7.0  33.8 
Estonia  3.7  229.0  -9.7  22.2 
Hungary  61.1  129.0  -1.8  48.9 
Poland  44.0  75.3  -4.0  26.3 
Slovenia  24.0  130.1  -3.9  29.6 
Notes  
Debt figures are based on EU estimates.  
Trade to GDP is the ratio of the volume of export plus imports of goods and services to GDP.  
Trade balance to GDP is the ratio of exports minus imports to GDP.  
Financial wealth stock estimates are constructed by NIESR in collaboration with Central Bank staff 
from the relevant countries. Financial wealth includes bank deposits, equities and other holdings of 
financial assets including government bonds and all currencies less borrowing from banks and other 
financial institutions. 
The appropriate choice of monetary regime in the pre-EMU period will depend on the 
initial degree of real exchange rate misalignment, the relative openness of the 
economy, the degree of fiscal consolidation required and the need for importing 
monetary stability. We simulate the response to different shocks under fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and 
Slovenia. We consider the response under different regimes to a series of shocks that 
permanently shift the real exchange rates of these economies. There is clearly a trade-
off between the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime and the loss of the 
exchange rate as an automatic stabiliser. Under a fixed regime, the economy is 
expected to exhibit more cyclical behaviour, but the output response to a fiscal 
stimulus is expected to be stronger initially.  
We next consider the shock of joining the Euro Area in Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Relative to a baseline where the economies do not join the euro, we 
simulate scenarios with each of the three economies joining in 2005, 2006, 2007,   5 
2008 and 2009
1. At the time of joining, interest rates converge on those prevailing in 
the Euro Area and the exchange rate is permanently tied to the euro. The later a 
country joins, the more closely it has converged with the Euro Area, and the smaller 
the shock to the economy. After 2008, our simulations indicate that there is little to be 
gained by waiting further, as the most rapid period of convergence is expected to be 
completed. This should not, however, be taken as decisive in the timing of 
membership of EMU. There are other gains to be made from membership, and our 
analysis does not take into account the gains to welfare and output of greater 
competition as a result of increased price transparency, nor does it reflect the possible 
effects of an increase in investment that might follow from greater exchange rate 
certainty. This should also not be taken as an indication of feasibility. Specifically, 
model simulations cannot guarantee that the Maastricht criteria will be met by the 
specified date. 
II.  Real effective exchange rate movements 
All five countries considered in this study have exhibited a strong real appreciation of 
the exchange rate during the transition period, as expected due to both the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and Purchasing Power Parity condition discussed above. The real 
appreciation can be effected either through an appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate or a positive inflation differential relative to a country’s main trading partners. If 
the exchange rate i s fixed, inflation is the only source of appreciation. There is, 
potentially, a trade-off between the monetary credibility gained from a fixed exchange 
rate regime and the loss of the exchange rate as a source of real appreciation. 
However, a flexible exchange rate can be associated with a higher risk premium, and 
this may weaken the exchange rate.    6 
The Maastricht criteria for EMU membership require both a stable exchange rate 
against the euro and convergence in inflation rates with the Euro Area. This is 
incompatible with a real appreciation of the exchange rate, and has implications for 
the timing of EMU membership. In the medium-term, economies can expect to 
achieve an equilibrium real exchange rate, which should depend upon fundamentals
2. 
But in the short term, joining with a real exchange rate that was below its long run 
sustainable value would cause inflation to be higher than required by the Treaty for 
some years and monetary conditions would appear loose. Hence early membership 
may be precluded by an undervalued exchange rate, as it will produce more inflation 
in the two years of stable exchange rates that are required before full membership. 
Table 2.  Real effective exchange rate movements decomposed 
Annual percentage change 
           1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  1992-
2000* 
Real exchange rate  22.4  7.0  4.3  6.7  1.9  7.4  -0.2  2.9  63.7 
Nom. Exchange rate  6.4  0.9  -0.9  1.8  -2.5  0.0  -2.7  2.2  5.0 
Czech 
Republic 
Relative price  15.6  6.5  5.4  4.8  4.4  7.0  2.3  0.4  56.2 
Real exchange rate  101.9  35.4  22.7  18.6  4.9  8.2  1.1  -1.0  351.8 
Nom. Exchange rate  11.7  -2.7  0.2  -1.5  -2.5  1.4  -0.8  -2.2  2.9  Estonia 
Relative price  82.4  39.3  22.5  20.4  7.5  6.6  1.9  1.1  342.2 
Real exchange rate  9.1  -0.4  -5.3  2.1  6.7  -1.0  2.8  2.8  17.4 
Nom. Exchange rate  -5.4  -13.5 -23.4-15.4  -7.5  -11.2  -6.2  -4.4  -60.9  Hungary 
Relative price  15.7  15.5  23.9  20.2  15.3  11.5  9.4  7.4  200.7 
Real exchange rate  4.4  4.1  6.4  8.6  3.9  5.5  -3.8  11.5  47.7 
Nom. Exchange rate  -17.2 -21.8 -14.7 -7.2  -7.3  -3.8  -9.0  3.7  -56.8  Poland 
Relative price  26.2  33.0  24.3  16.9  12.0  9.4  5.5  7.4  239.0 
Real exchange rate  0.4  1.1  9.4  -3.5  1.5  3.8  -0.6  -0.7  11.4 
Nom. Exchange rate  -20.8 -13.0  0.7  -10.2  -4.2  -2.0  -4.7  -6.8  -48.0  Slovenia 
Relative price  25.9  16.1  8.8  7.4  5.8  5.6  4.2  6.3  111.4 
* Aggregate percentage change since 1992. 
Source: NiGEM database. Effective weights determined by 1994 trade weights. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
1 These are illustrative examples only, as currently no country is expected to join before 2006. 
2 These fundamentals may reflect PPPs, which depend on the relative prices of bundles of goods and 
services produced in the economy. However, even in small open economies PPP may be misleading 
because some markets will be imperfectly competitive and some products may not be easily   7 
Table 2 reports the annual percentage change in the real effective exchange rate in the 
five countries covered by this study since 1993, decomposed into movements in the 
nominal effective exchange rate and relative prices. The bulk of this appreciation has 
been effected through relative prices, as one might expect if the Balassa Samuelson 
effect were very significant, which it must have been during the early years of 
transition. The nominal effective exchange rate has shown a modest tendency to 
appreciate in the Czech Republic
3 and Estonia
4, but the nominal effective exchange 
rates in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have all depreciated by 50-60 per cent since 
1992.  
The real appreciation has been strongest in Estonia, where productivity is lowest 
relative to the EU average, and weakest in Slovenia, where productivity is closest to 
the EU average. This conforms to our expectations in light of the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect and quality convergence, as the larger the productivity gap the greater the 
opportunity for convergence. The strength of the real appreciation in the Czech 
Republic is less expected, as aggregate productivity has recorded only modest 
convergence on EU levels since 1993. In part this may reflect the fact that aggregate 
data cannot capture differences in productivity growth across sectors, which is in fact 
the driving force behind the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The real appreciations may 
also be capturing a correction of a temporary deviation of the real effective exchange 
rate from its equilibrium level. Smidkova et al (2002) suggest that in the first half of 
the 1990s real effective exchange rates were undervalued relative to their equilibrium 
level  in all five economies. In order maintain a stable external balance, a real 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
comparable across countries. However, movements in PPPs may indicate movements in the sustainable 
real exchange rate. 
3 Monetary Policy has perhaps been more restrictive in this country than in other transition economies 
with flexible rates.   8 
appreciation was therefore necessary. This may have played a more important role in 
the Czech Republic than in the other 4 economies. 
 
Table 3.  Productivity relative to EU average
5 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2000/1993* 
Czech Republic  52.2  52.4  51.4  53.1  54.7  53.8  53.3  53.9  3.2 
Estonia  27.7  27.1  26.5  28.7  30.1  32.6  34.3  35.2  27.0 
Hungary  47.8  50.1  51.8  52.7  53.2  54.6  55.8  55.9  16.8 
Poland  31.7  33.5  34.8  36.2  37.5  39.0  39.9  42.5  34.1 
Slovenia  61.9  63.8  66.4  68.2  70.4  72.7  74.4  76.3  23.4 
* Aggregate percentage change since 1993. 
Source: NIESR estimates based on IMF WEO database 
Table 3 reports aggregate labour productivity in the five countries relative to the EU 
average since 1993. Productivity is lowest in Estonia and highest in Slovenia. Poland 
has recorded the strongest rise in productivity since 1993, while the Czech Republic 
has recorded the weakest growth. However, aggregate productivity in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary remains somewhat stronger than in Poland. The argument for 
further appreciation of the real exchange rate in Slovenia is weaker than in the other 
economies, as productivity levels in Slovenia have already converged on those in EU 
countries such as Greece and Portugal, and price levels in Slovenia have also largely 
converged on those in the EU. 
III.  Real exchange rate realignments and Maastricht criteria  
Upon accession to the EU, the new Member States will be expected to participate in 
the ERM II. They will not be offered an opt-out clause like Denmark or the UK, and 
will be expected to join the Euro Area when conditions allow. The timing will depend 
on the ability of each country to meet the Maastricht criteria on exchange rate, interest 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 This reflects in part the devaluation of the Finnish markka before ERM membership and the weakness 
of the Swedish crown, both of which have significant weights in the Estonian effective exchange rate 
5 Productivity is measured as real GDP calculated at PPPs, as estimated by the IMF.   9 
rate and inflation convergence and fiscal stability. According to the Maastricht 
criteria, inflation must not exceed the average of the three best performing Member 
States by more than 1.5 percentage points. The exchange rate requirements are to 
respect the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two 
years before the examination for entry into EMU. The fluctuation margins allow a 
deviation of ±15 per cent around the central rate, which permits a significant degree 
of flexibility. Throughout 2000 and 2001, exchange rates in all five countries have 
remained within a comparable band width. The Polish currency has exhibited the 
greatest fluctuation, within a band of about ±11.5 per cent around the average euro 
exchange rate over the past two years. 
The third criterion is to target a balanced budget over the medium-term. In the short-
term the deficit must not rise above 3 per cent of GDP. The deficit target should not 
pose a problem for Estonia or Slovenia, where finances are close to balance. 
However, the deficits in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic all exceeded 3 per 
cent of GDP in 2001, indicating that some degree of fiscal tightening will be 
necessary in the run-up to EMU membership. This may be incompatible with the 
extra expenditure needed to implement the acquis communitaire, as required for EU 
membership, and this may delay entry into EMU. However, the Commission has 
made it clear that it will sympathetically consider the case for deficit financed public 
investment in countries with low productivity and otherwise sound public finances. 
Only Hungary and Poland have noticeable debt stocks, as can be seen from Table 1, 
and hence the other countries may be allowed some flexibility in this area.   10 
The Maastricht criteria also include targets on the government debt ratio and on long-
term interest rates. The government debt target of 60 per cent of GDP will not pose a 
problem for any of the five countries covered by this study, as debt remains relatively 
low
6. Long-term interest rates should take care of themselves if inflation expectations 
fall to levels compatible with the Maastricht criteria. 
Given the flexibility allowed within the ERM II, some degree of real appreciation is 
possible within the Maastricht framework. The inflation criterion is more rigid, 
especially if the variance of inflation rates within the Euro Area rises. In January 
2002, the average inflation rate in the three best performers was a full ½ percentage 
point lower than the EU average, suggesting that inflation may have to be maintained 
within 1 percentage point of the EU average to pass the Maastricht criteria. Monetary 
policy may be held tighter than necessary to ensure the inflation target is met.  
An estimate of the expected appreciation in each country would allow us to assess the 
consequences of attaining the Maastricht criteria at a given time. De Broeck and Sløk 
(2001) find that a 1 per cent rise in relative productivity is associated with a 0.4 per 
cent real appreciation. If we expect productivity levels to converge towards those in 
Portugal, at a minimum, they should eventually attain a level of about 60 per cent of 
the EU average. Slovenia has already exceeded this level, so simple productivity 
differentials do not necessarily point to further convergence in this country. 
According to the De Broeck and Sløk estimates, the real exchange rates of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary should appreciate by a further 3½ per cent if aggregate 
productivity reaches 60 per cent of the EU average. The Polish real exchange rate 
should appreciate by about 18 per cent and the Estonian real exchange rate should 
                                                                 
6 Even if deficits remain above 3 per cent of GDP for several years, our projections suggest that the 
debt to GDP ratio will exceed 60 per cent in the Czech Republic or Poland, and will stabilise at 60-65   11 
appreciate by about 28 per cent by these estimates. If convergence in productivity 
takes place at a steady pace over about 10 years, Estonia should experience an 
appreciation of about 2½ per cent per annum and Poland should experience an 
appreciation of about 1½ per cent per annum. Sinn and Reutter (2001) and Égert 
(2001) both expect the appreciation in Poland to be somewhat faster in the short-term, 
at 3-4 per cent per annum. Égert also expects stronger appreciation in Hungary than 
the productivity differential would suggest. Other estimates suggest that the Balassa-
Samuelson effect will cause the real exchange rate to appreciate by about 1-2 percent 
per annum in the short to medium term. 
Smidkova et al (2002) suggest that the fundamental real exchange rates appreciated 
by about 4-6 per cent per annum on average in the first half of the nineties. The 
fundamental appreciation then continued at a slower pace of around 1-2 per cent per 
annum until 2001.   The rate of fundamental appreciation will fall over time as 
productivity levels converge on EU levels. By 2005, the equilibrium real appreciation 
is expected to fall to about 1 per cent per annum. The actual real appreciation 
expected depends on the current deviation of the real exchange rate from its 
fundamental level. By end-2001, the currencies of all five countries, with the 
exception of Slovenia, appeared to be somewhat overvalued, while Slovenia was 
close to its fundamental level.  This suggests that the growth rates mentioned above 
over-estimate the real appreciation that we are likely to see. On our baseline scenario, 
the real effective exchange rate is expected to grow by 2-2.5 per cent per annum in 
Poland and Estonia between 2005 and 2010; by 0.5-1 per cent per annum in Hungary 
and the Czech Republic; and by 0-0.5 per cent per annum in Slovenia. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
per cent in Hungary.   12 
IV.  Simulations under fixed and flexible regimes 
Below we undertake a series of simulations to analyse the response to shocks under 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. We first discuss the structure of the model, 
and investigate the implications of a technology shock in the Euro Area, a fiscal 
tightening in the E uro Area, and a shock to FDI inflows into the 5 transition 
economies. We then analyse the impact of the timing of EMU membership. 
IV.1 The model and its properties. 
A full description of the model can be found in Barrell et al (2002). Small macro-
models of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia have been 
incorporated into an existing global econometric model, NiGEM. NiGEM is a large-
scale quarterly macroeconomic model of the world economy. The model is essentially 
New-Keynesian in its approach, in that agents are presumed to be forward-looking, at 
least in some markets, but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to 
external events. It has complete demand and supply sides, and there is an extensive 
monetary and financial sector. Linkages between countries take place through trade, 
through interacting financial markets and through international stocks of assets. By 
incorporating the models into an existing global model, we ensure that growth 
projections are consistent with our estimates of world growth, and allow full 
feedbacks with the rest of the world in response to policy shifts. 
As far as possible, the same theoretical structure is applied to all countries in NiGEM, 
except where clear institutional or other factors prevent this. As a result, variations in 
the properties of each country model reflect genuine differences emerging from 
estimation, rather than different theoretical approaches. One of the key differences 
between the models of the accession economies and the standard NiGEM structure is   13 
the important role played by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is modelled 
explicitly within the foreign asset system. FDI has been shown to play an important 
role in enterprise restructuring in transition economies. It has an impact on labour 
productivity, trade patterns, and the level of fixed investment. We have, therefore, 
incorporated a supply side model of FDI and modelled the effects of FDI on the 
domestic economy. In general FDI raises exports and labour productivity in similar 
ways across countries, although the impact on output from these channels would 
differ, as labour shares and export propensities differ. We also find a role for FDI in 
imports, as do Barrell and te Velde (2002) in the EU countries, but we find that the 
impact of FDI on imports is higher in Poland than elsewhere, and this colours our 
results below. 
The underlying economic structure of the model is relatively standard. Domestic 
demand, aggregate supply and the external sector are linked together through the 
wage-price system, income and wealth, the financial sector, the government sector 
and competitiveness. The supply-side of the economy is centred around a CES 
production function that determines factor demands. Wages are determined by a 
simple bargaining process over the share of labour in total output. Domestic prices are 
determined as a mark-up over production costs, which are a weighted average of 
domestic production costs and import prices. The mark-up is based on the elasticity of 
demand, which is determined as a pro-cyclical function of the business cycle, 
captured by capacity utilisation. The wage-price system affects competitiveness and 
income and wealth. Competitiveness feeds into the external sector, while income and 
wealth feed into domestic demand through private consumption. The wage-price 
system also affects total government receipts and expenditure through indirect taxes 
and transfers to households.   14 
The external sector feeds into domestic demand through the impact of net foreign 
assets and interest income on household income and wealth, while domestic demand 
feeds back into the external sector as a determinant of imports and FDI. FDI affects 
domestic demand through investment, aggregate supply through productivity and the 
external sector through both exports and imports. The financial sector affects 
domestic demand through the impact of interest rates on investment and consumption, 
and feeds into the government sector through interest payments on government debt. 
The government sector feeds into consumption through the stock of government debt, 
which affects household wealth, and income tax, which feeds into real disposable 
income.  
In order to undertake effective policy analysis we have to be able to use the 
assumption that agents can look forward and that expectations are rational. This in 
turn requires that agents use the implications of the model in their expectations 
formation. The use of rational expectations for policy analysis requires that the 
modeller construct a coherent forward base of about 20 years to run off. It is also 
important that the model being used contains an equilibrium growth path and has the 
feedbacks to return to that real equilibrium.  
The model can run under are a number of different monetary policy options. There are 
two main scenarios to choose from regarding exchange rate policy: fixed exchange 
rates or flexible exchange rates. Flexible exchange rates respond to expected changes 
in relative interest rates, to ensure the UIP condition holds, after allowing for an 
interest rate premium. We assume that there is a premium on accession country 
interest rates, to reflect higher levels of risk relative to the Euro Area. Expectations 
can be either forward-looking or backward-looking.    15 
With a fixed exchange rate regime, the exchange rate path follows the euro:  
  1 1 / * - - = ELRX ELRX RX RX             (1) 
where RX represents the domestic currency exchange rate relative to the dollar and 
ELRX represents the euro/dollar exchange rate.  
Under a flexible regime, the exchange rate is no longer seen as an instrument of 
policy, but as an outcome from the interaction of fiscal policy, an inflation oriented 
monetary policy and the external environment. Forward-looking floating exchange 
rates solve the open arbitrage condition, allowing an interest rate premium (IPREM). 
))) 100 ( * ) 3 100 /(( 100 * ) 3 100 ln(( * 25 . 0
) / * ln( ) ln( 1 1
IPREM M ELR M R
ELRX ELRX RX RX
+ + + -
= + +
  (2) 
where R3M is the short-term interest rate in the domestic economy and ELR3M is the 
short-term interest rate prevailing in the Euro Area.  
Within a flexible exchange rate regime, we assume interest rates are determined by a 
rule-guided policy, as opposed to discretionary policy. The belief that rule-guided 
actions, based on clear and announced principles provides a better framework with 
which to conduct macro policy because prevalent during the 1980s-1990s in the 
market economies. We adopt simple policy rules, where the policy instrument is 
expressed as a function of the deviation of the target variable from its target value. 
Simple feedback rules limit the amount of information that is taken from the model 
and thereby reduce the complexity of the rule considerably.   16 
The rule we adopt mimics the ECB’s 2 pillar strategy for maintaining price stability
7. 
The ECB sets an inflation target, which it aims to achieve within the constraints of a 
nominal target for the stock of money.   
*) ( 50 *) ( 75 . 0 3 t t t t t PY PY M R - + - = p p           (3) 
where R3M is the short term interest rate, p is the expected inflation rate, PY is the 
log of nominal GDP and * denotes target variables.  
Within a fixed exchange rate regime, the interest rate is no longer seen as an 
instrument of policy, but adjusts to ensure that the UIP condition holds. We invert the 
exchange rate open arbitrage condition in equation (2). This allows the interest rate to 
jump in forward-looking mode: 
  100 100 / ) 100 *(




+ = + +
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      (4) 
IV.2  European technology shock 
In the first set of simulations we raise the equilibrium level of output by 1% in the 
Euro Area permanently by raising the rate of technical progress for a limited period. 
The shock raises the level of the labour augmenting technology trend (but not its rate 
of growth) in all Euro Area countries, and the effects of this shift take time to feed 
through to the level of output
8. This is a supply shock to the production function of all 
Euro Area countries. Technical progress raises labour productivity and feeds into the 
production function through the labour demand curve. The rise in technical progress 
raises output and incomes in the Euro Area and hence raises external demand in the 
                                                                 
7 See ECB (2000). The parameters we use do not reflect estimation. It does deliver the style of reaction 
we would expect form a stability oriented central bank in our model. We have discussed the react 
function with our user group, which includes the ECB, and there have been no major criticisms. 
8 We shift TECHL in all countries by approximately 1.5%, as the labour share is approximately 2/3rds.    17 
accession countries. It also causes the real effective exchange rate of the Euro Area to 
depreciate. The technical progress shock means that more of the same goods are being 
produced at the same cost, and hence in an imperfectly competitive world their 
relative price has to fall. Inflation drops temporarily, leading to interest rate cuts in the 
Euro Area. In the long-run the price level in the Euro Area remains permanently 
below base
9.  
Figure 1.    Impact of EU technology shock on real exchange rate in Hungary 


































There is a corresponding a ppreciation of the real effective exchange rates in the 
accession countries, as they do not experience the same technology shock, and hence 
they are producing the same goods in the same quantities as in the past, and their 
relative price rises as more goods are produced elsewhere. Figure 1 illustrates the 
impact on the real effective exchange rate in Hungary under fixed and flexible 
exchange rates and Table 4 reports results for all five countries. Ultimately, the real 
exchange rate reaches the same level under both the fixed and flexible regimes. In 
Hungary the shock leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate of approximately 
                                                                 
9 Further details of this style of shock can be found in Barrell, Dury and Holland (2001)   18 
0.6 per cent. Under a flexible regime, this long-run level is achieved more quickly, as 
the exchange rate adjusts directly after ECB rates are reduced.  
Table 4.  Impact of EU technology shock   
    Price level  Real exchange rate 
    Flexible  Fixed  Flexible  Fixed 
Czech Republic After 1 year  0.08  0.14  0.34  0.30 
 After 2 years  0.11  0.17  0.46  0.55 
 After 5 years  0.16  0.00  0.56  0.75 
 After 10 years  0.23  -0.35  0.57  0.52 
Estonia  After 1 year  0.13  0.23  0.41  0.38 
 After 2 years  0.17  0.26  0.51  0.62 
 After 5 years  0.21  0.02  0.56  0.70 
 After 10 years  0.22  -0.32  0.57  0.46 
Hungary  After 1 year  0.11  0.22  0.40  0.37 
 After 2 years  0.15  0.24  0.49  0.59 
 After 5 years  0.22  0.01  0.54  0.69 
 After 10 years  0.30  -0.31  0.53  0.47 
Poland  After 1 year  0.02  0.21  0.53  0.32 
 After 2 years  0.00  0.29  0.61  0.60 
 After 5 years  -0.11  0.16  0.71  0.78 
 After 10 years  -0.40  -0.06  0.84  0.69 
Slovenia  After 1 year  0.08  0.19  0.38  0.33 
 After 2 years  0.09  0.23  0.46  0.58 
 After 5 years  0.10  -0.03  0.53  0.66 
 After 10 years  0.14  -0.33  0.55  0.49 
 
Even after 10 years, the real exchange rate under a fixed regime remains below the 
long-run level given by the flexible regime in all five countries, as Table 4 shows. If 
the exchange rate in the accession countries is fixed to the euro, the nominal exchange 
rate follows that in the Euro Area. In this case the entire adjustment of the real 
effective exchange rate must be effected through the price level, while the nominal 
effective exchange rate will actually move in the opposite direction, as the euro 
depreciates.    19 
Since prices adjust more gradually than exchange rates, and the nominal effective 
exchange rate pulls in the opposite direction when it is fixed, a cyclical effect is 
introduced into the model under a fixed exchange rate regime. In addition, under 
floating rates the initial impact of the shock on the real exchange is larger in the least 
open economy, Poland, than elsewhere. The price levels in the more open economies 
are more influenced by import prices than that in Poland, and even under floating 
rates their real exchange rates adjust rapidly.  
Figure 2.    Net impact of fixed exchange rates on output 


































Figure 2 illustrates the cyclical impact of the fixed regime on GDP. We plot the 
percentage difference of GDP under the fixed regime relative to the flexible regime. 
Initially, output is higher under the fixed regime, but after about 4 years output is 
lower under the fixed regime in most countries. In the long-run, the choice of regimes 
does not affect the level of output. The relative advantage of fixed rates is greater for 
the closed economy, Poland, as it allows the real exchange rate to adjust more slowly,   20 
producing a relatively smaller effect on output. Market economies have many 
stabilising mechanisms, and the most important involve the rapid adjustment of the 
economy to changes in relative prices. A small open economy like Estonia has strong 
feedbacks, and returns to equilibrium relatively quickly. The more important financial 
wealth is in the economy the more quickly the economy responds to a price shock. 
When prices rise, real wealth falls, and this reduces consumption, and hence output 
and income adjust more rapidly to equilibrium. Hungary has the largest wealth stock 
and this is a major factor behind its relatively rapid adjustment. The automatic 
stabilisers of the market through wealth and competitiveness are less strong in the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia than in the Hungary and Estonia.  
Our results suggest that most countries, in particular the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, benefit from a flexible exchange rate regime in the face of a technology 
shock in the Euro Area that is not matched in the accession countries. The negative 
impact on output in the long-run outweighs the short-term positive impact on output.  
However, in Poland, the results suggest that a fixed regime may be preferable, as 
there is a strong positive impact on output under the fixed regime relative to the 
flexible regime. In Hungary and Estonia the gross impact on output is roughly neutral 
under both scenarios. However, the cyclical behaviour under the fixed regime is likely 
to raise uncertainty and increase the risk premium in these countries, suggesting that a 
flexible regime may be preferable in the face of such a shock.  
IV.3  European fiscal tightening 
In the next set of simulations, we reduce the rate of growth in the Euro Area for a 
sustained period of time by introducing a permanent fiscal tightening. We increase the 
budget target by 1 percentage point of GDP, which is financed through a rise in 
income tax. The deficit in all countries is reduced by 1% of GDP permanently after a   21 
process of adjustment. This reduces external demand in the accession countries for a 
number of years. It also lowers the equilibrium real interest rate in all economies, as a 
fiscal tightening allows interest rates to fall. There is a significant impact on world 
savings and investment flows from this fiscal change. As in the previous simulation, 
the real effective exchange rate of the Euro Area depreciates. Since the shock occurs 
in the Euro Area, interest rates in this region fall first and to a greater degree than in 
other regions. As real interest rates fall in the Euro Area more than elsewhere, the UIP 
condition requires a depreciation of the nominal euro exchange rate.   
Figure 3.  Impact of an EU fiscal tightening on Slovenia  
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There is a corresponding appreciation of the real effective exchange rates in the 
accession countries. Under a fixed exchange rate regime the currency depreciates in 
line with the euro, and the real appreciation is effected through a rise in prices.  
Interest rates in the Euro Area are cut to counterbalance the fiscal tightening, and this 
stimulates inflation in the accession countries. Under a flexible exchange rate regime 
there is some nominal appreciation of the exchange rate, and relative prices do not   22 
rise as much as under the fixed regime. Figure 3 illustrates the impact on the nominal 
effective exchange rate and relative prices in Slovenia under fixed and flexible 
exchange rates. Table 5 reports the results for all five countries. 
Table 5.  Impact of fiscal tightening in Euro Area  
    Relative Prices  Nominal effective 
exchange rate 
    Flexible  Fixed  Flexible  Fixed 
Czech Republic After 1 year  0.04  0.09  0.07  -0.13 
 After 2 years  0.03  0.15  0.13  -0.16 
 After 5 years  0.11  0.45  0.14  -0.21 
 After 10 years  0.41  0.65  -0.11  -0.21 
Estonia  After 1 year  0.16  0.23  0.01  -0.19 
 After 2 years  0.18  0.34  0.03  -0.22 
 After 5 years  0.21  0.54  -0.04  -0.28 
 After 10 years  0.38  0.44  -0.23  -0.28 
Hungary  After 1 year  0.14  0.22  0.05  -0.17 
 After 2 years  0.16  0.33  0.08  -0.20 
 After 5 years  0.27  0.60  0.03  -0.26 
 After 10 years  0.54  0.65  -0.21  -0.26 
Poland  After 1 year  0.02  0.18  0.28  -0.18 
 After 2 years  0.00  0.33  0.37  -0.22 
 After 5 years  -0.12  0.64  0.61  -0.28 
 After 10 years  -0.33  0.89  1.04  -0.29 
Slovenia  After 1 year  0.07  0.15  0.11  -0.14 
 After 2 years  0.07  0.26  0.17  -0.16 
 After 5 years  0.03  0.48  0.25  -0.22 
 After 10 years  0.21  0.62  0.11  -0.22 
 
In the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary, the impact on relative prices and the 
nominal effective exchange rate is approximately the same in the long-run. These 
economies are all relatively open and relatively flexible and adjustment comes 
through the price level and not so much the exchange rate. Relative prices rise by 
slightly less under the flexible regime and the exchange rate depreciates by slightly 
less in the long-run. The impact feeds through more gradually under the flexible 
regime. In Slovenia and Poland, the nominal exchange rate appreciates in the long-  23 
run, and relative prices remain much lower under the flexible regime. Poland is the 
least open of these economies, and the required real appreciation comes through the 
operation of the financial markets rather than through prices rising. Slovenia is a 
relatively slowly responding economy, and hence a nominal increase in the exchange 
rate is also more likely. In all cases, the impact on the real effective exchange rate is 
equivalent in the long-run under both the flexible and fixed regimes. 
Figure 4.  Net impact of fixed exchange rates on output  













































Figure 4 illustrates the gross impact on GDP of the fixed regime relative to the 
flexible regime. As in the previous simulation, initially output is higher under the 
fixed regime, responding to the cut in interest rates. But after about 8-10 years output 
is lower under the fixed regime in most countries. Again, Poland stands out from the 
others, in that GDP is always higher under the fixed regime. This is another argument 
in favour of a fixed exchange rate regime in Poland if fiscal tightening is anticipated 
in the Euro Area. An expansionary fiscal policy in the Euro Area would obviously   24 
have the opposite effect, and if this were anticipated a flexible regime would be 
favoured. A flexible regime would limit volatility in all countries, and this may reduce 
the interest rate premium, which offers support for a flexible regime. 
IV.4  Increased FDI inflows 
In the next set of simulations we raise productivity and net trade in the accession 
countries through an increase in FDI inflows. This shock differs from the technical 
progress shock in the EU described above, as FDI feeds directly into the trade 
equations as well as into the production function. As such, it effectively acts as an 
increase in the variety or quality of goods produced, filling what Romer (1993) terms 
‘idea gaps’. As discussed in the Introduction above, this should normally put upward 
pressure on the real exchange rate when real output expands, which is the reverse of 
the impact of the technology shock in the Euro Area, where quality and variety were 
unchanged. However, the overall impact of the shock will depend upon the 
parameters in the model and on the ratios of exports and imports to GDP. If the 
impact of FDI on imports, both directly and through the impact on the level of output 
is greater than its impact on exports then GDP may not rise. This can happen either 
because the elasticity on exports is low relative to demand effects, or because exports 
are markedly smaller than imports. 
We raise the level of FDI in each country 30 percent progressively over 15 years, and 
then leave the rate of growth of the stock the same as on our baseline, and hence the 
stock of FDI is 30% higher than it would have been in the medium term. Figures 5 
and 6 illustrate the impact on the real effective exchange rate and GDP in the Czech 
Republic and Table 6 reports the impact on the real exchange rate and GDP in all five 
economies.    25 
Figure 5.  Impact of FDI shock on real exchange rate in the Czech Republic 



























Figure 6.  Impact of FDI shock on GDP in the Czech Republic 


























As discussed above, the coefficients on FDI in exports and technology are the same in 
all countries, and hence the long run impacts here will differ only because of the 
different ratios of exports to GDP, FDI to GDP and the labour share in output on our   26 
baseline. Different starting values and projections for these ratios would give different 
impacts of the shock. The coefficient on FDI in imports in Poland is noticeably higher 
than in the other countries, which all have the same coefficient. This alone will mean 
that the results for Poland are markedly different from other countries in the long run. 
Table 6.  Impact of FDI shock on real exchange rates and GDP  
    Real exchange rate  GDP 
    Flexible  Fixed  Flexible  Fixed 
Czech Republic After 1 year  0.24  0.02  -0.10  0.04 
 After 2 years  0.28  0.04  -0.13  0.10 
 After 5 years  0.43  0.15  0.13  0.65 
 After 10 years  0.59  0.45  0.85  1.64 
Estonia  After 1 year  0.03  0.01  -0.02  0.00 
 After 2 years  0.03  0.00  -0.02  0.02 
 After 5 years  0.04  0.01  0.06  0.12 
 After 10 years  0.09  0.06  0.18  0.28 
Hungary  After 1 year  0.25  0.02  -0.10  0.04 
 After 2 years  0.28  0.05  -0.10  0.11 
 After 5 years  0.45  0.12  0.25  0.67 
 After 10 years  0.84  0.61  1.72  2.38 
Poland  After 1 year  -0.13  0.00  0.04  0.00 
 After 2 years  -0.15  -0.02  0.04  -0.02 
 After 5 years  -0.31  -0.15  0.02  -0.10 
 After 10 years  -0.84  -0.44  -0.03  -0.19 
Slovenia  After 1 year  0.28  0.02  -0.10  0.06 
 After 2 years  0.29  0.05  -0.06  0.17 
 After 5 years  0.46  0.22  0.24  0.62 
 After 10 years  0.85  0.57  1.01  1.72 
 
The shock increases the stock of FDI by about 30 per cent after 15 years. Under a 
flexible regime, the nominal exchange rate jumps in the first quarter of the simulation. 
The real exchange rate, therefore, initially exhibits a stronger appreciation under the 
flexible regime than under the fixed regime in the Czech Republic. In the long-run the 
impact is the same, with a real appreciation of about 0.5 per cent. Output is higher 
under a fixed regime over the simulation period, although the long run impact will be 
the same in both regimes. The faster appreciation of the real exchange rate restrains   27 
export growth under the flexible regime. Productivity improvement take longer to 
feed through than trade responses, so the initial impact on output is even negative 
under the flexible regime. The long-run impact on output is higher in Hungary than in 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Hungary benefits in part on our model because it 
has the smallest trade deficit amongst the 5 countries and therefore the net impact on 
exports minus imports is the greatest, and this does seem to reflect its relative 
experience over the last decade.  
There is virtually no impact on the real exchange rate or GDP in Estonia, while there 
is a strong negative impact in Poland. This reflects a negative impact on the trade 
balance in these economies, and this is explained by the starting values on Table 1 for 
the trade balance in both countries. In Estonia this negative trade balance effect 
reflects the noticeably higher ratio of imports to GDP as compared to exports to GDP, 
or put another way, the scale of the trade deficit in 2000 and in our baseline 
projection. This means that higher imports counter-balance the positive impact on 
productivity. In Poland the negative trade balance outweighs any positive impact on 
productivity because of both the higher trade deficit and the greater impact of FDI on 
imports. This reflects the nature of FDI and relocation in Poland, where processing 
rather than production is a major feature of foreign firms. If the import content of FDI 
related production can be reduced whilst leaving incentives to invest and to raise 
productivity, Poland could benefit in the same way as the other economies. These 
differences may also reflect the relatively low levels of education and skills in the 
Polish economy, and policies to address these problems would help improve the 
impact of FDI on productivity as well as raise it directly.   28 
Figure 7 and Table 7 decompose the real exchange rate movements into the impact on 
the nominal exchange rate and relative prices. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
the nominal exchange rate is unchanged, of course, so the change to the real exchange 
rate is effected entirely through relative prices. Under a flexible regime, the nominal 
exchange rate appreciates as the external balance improves. This is counterbalanced 
by a fall in the inflation differential relative to the main trading partners. Similar 
patterns can be observed for all countries, as can be seen in Table 7. 
Figure 7.  Impact of FDI shock on the Czech Republic 
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Under the flexible regime, the nominal exchange rate in Poland depreciates by 1.5 per 
cent after 10 years. Rather than an indication of the appropriate exchange rate regime, 
we interpret this as an indication that the government should try to target a different 
type of FDI. The FDI that has flowed into Poland has had little impact on export 
growth or productivity growth. The FDI in Hungary has been the strongest at   29 
promoting growth, followed by Slovenia. The impact on GDP is stronger under the 
fixed regime in all countries with the exception of Poland. 
Table 7.  Impact of FDI shock on nominal exchange rates and prices  
    Nominal effective 
exchange rate 
Relative prices 
    Flexible  Fixed  Flexible  Fixed 
Czech Republic After 1 year  0.34  0.01  -0.10  0.01 
 After 2 years  0.45  0.01  -0.17  0.04 
 After 5 years  0.92  0.01  -0.49  0.14 
 After 10 years  1.69  0.02  -1.08  0.44 
Estonia  After 1 year  0.05  0.01  -0.02  0.00 
 After 2 years  0.07  0.01  -0.04  0.00 
 After 5 years  0.16  0.01  -0.11  0.02 
 After 10 years  0.35  0.02  -0.22  0.08 
Hungary  After 1 year  0.46  0.01  -0.21  0.01 
 After 2 years  0.62  0.01  -0.34  0.04 
 After 5 years  1.46  0.01  -0.99  0.11 
 After 10 years  3.38  0.02  -2.45  0.59 
Poland  After 1 year  -0.21  0.01  0.08  -0.01 
 After 2 years  -0.28  0.01  0.13  -0.03 
 After 5 years  -0.58  0.01  0.27  -0.16 
 After 10 years  -1.55  0.02  0.73  -0.46 
Slovenia  After 1 year  0.46  0.01  -0.18  0.01 
 After 2 years  0.60  0.01  -0.31  0.05 
 After 5 years  1.16  0.01  -0.69  0.20 
 After 10 years  2.45  0.02  -1.57  0.55 
 
IV.5  Timing of EMU membership 
In the next set of simulations, we consider the timing of EMU membership. We look 
at the impact on the real exchange rate, GDP and inflation in Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic if they join in one of 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. We do not 
repeat these tests in Estonia, where the exchange rate is already directly tied to the 
euro, or in Slovenia, where the argument for a future appreciation of the real exchange 
rate is weak. We also do not look at the inevitable gains that would come from greater 
competition and price transparency as a result of EMU, nor do we look at the impacts 
on trade. As Pain (2002) suggests, these impacts can be large, and could easily offset 
any transitional problems.    30 
Membership of the Euro Area requires that interest rates in the country joining the 
Union fall to the EMU level, and that the exchange rate subsequently moves in line 
with the euro. We implement this change to our baseline in each of the years and 
countries mentioned above. The difference in the outcome is highly dependent upon 
our baseline assumptions, which have interest rates and exchange rates converging 
toward Euro Area rates gradually over time. The most rapid period of convergence is 
expected to take place by 2008, and this is reflected in steady reduction in the risk 
premium associated with each country prior to 2008.   
Figures 8 -10 illustrate the impact on the real exchange rate in each of the three 
countries at different joining times and rates. All entry rates produce the same real 
exchange rate in the long run in our model. In the short-run, there is a much stronger 
appreciation of the real exchange rate the earlier a country joins.  
Figure 8.  Impact on real exchange rate in the Czech Republic 









































































































































   31 
Figure 9.  Impact on real exchange rate in Hungary 














































































































































Figure 10.  Impact on real exchange rate in Poland 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































   32 
the nominal exchange rate relative to our baseline scenario the earlier the country 
joins. There is little perceptible difference between joining in 2008 and joining in 
2009, as the risk premium is expected to stabilise after this date. There is still a shock 
to the economy of joining in 2009, as joining EMU is expected to reduce the risk 
premium associated with transition country assets.  
Table 8.  Impact real effective exchange rate  
    Join 2005  Join 2006  Join 2007  Join 2008 
Czech Republic After 1 year  2.40  2.18  2.13  0.68 
 After 2 years  3.71  3.51  2.02  1.10 
 After 5 years  1.95  1.40  1.21  1.32 
 After 10 years  -0.76  -0.35  -0.01  0.24 
Hungary  After 1 year  2.51  2.36  2.37  0.85 
 After 2 years  3.38  3.31  1.78  1.17 
 After 5 years  0.80  0.66  0.76  1.01 
 After 10 years  -0.03  0.17  0.25  0.22 
Poland  After 1 year  2.37  2.13  2.02  0.80 
 After 2 years  3.22  2.97  1.69  1.12 
 After 5 years  1.09  0.95  1.04  1.27 
 After 10 years  -0.43  -0.06  0.24  0.52 
Table 9.  Impact on nominal exchange rate  
    Join 2005  Join 2006  Join 2007  Join 2008 
Czech Republic After 1 year  -3.28  -3.04  -3.03  -1.07 
 After 2 years  -6.07  -5.83  -3.94  -2.00 
 After 5 years  -10.48  -8.46  -6.61  -4.72 
 After 10 years  -14.63  -12.69  -10.91  -9.10 
Hungary  After 1 year  -3.28  -3.04  -3.03  -1.07 
 After 2 years  -6.07  -5.84  -3.94  -2.00 
 After 5 years  -10.48  -8.46  -6.61  -4.72 
 After 10 years  -14.63  -12.69  -10.91  -9.10 
Poland  After 1 year  -3.28  -3.04  -3.03  -1.07 
 After 2 years  -6.07  -5.83  -3.94  -2.00 
 After 5 years  -10.48  -8.46  -6.61  -4.72 
 After 10 years  -14.63  -12.69  -10.91  -9.10 
 
Tables 8 -11 report the impact on the real effective exchange rate, the nominal 
exchange rate against the US$, inflation and GDP of joining at different times. The   33 
impact on the nominal exchange rate is the same in all countries, as our baseline 
scenario assumes a constant risk premium across the three economies. The initial 
impact on inflation and output is strongest in Poland, which has the greatest interest 
rate differential with the Euro Area. The initial impact on inflation and output is 
initially weakest in the Czech Republic, where interest  rates have essentially 
converged on Euro Area rates. The Hungarian economy on our model adjusts more 
rapidly to shocks than the Czech economy and model, and after 10 years the impact 
on inflation in Hungary falls below that in the Czech Republic. This in part reflects 
the impact of the stabiliser produced by the relatively high wealth stock in Hungary. 
Higher inflation reduces real wealth and hence consumer demand, causing real output 
and prices to adjust more quickly. 
Table 10.  Impact on inflation
10 
    Join 2005  Join 2006  Join 2007  Join 2008 
Czech Republic After 1 year  -0.40  -0.36  -0.37  -0.12 
 After 2 years  -1.38  -1.33  -1.08  -0.43 
 After 5 years  -2.23  -1.73  -1.33  -1.01 
 After 10 years  -1.05  -1.02  -1.07  -1.17 
Hungary  After 1 year  -0.46  -0.42  -0.43  -0.15 
 After 2 years  -1.94  -1.85  -1.57  -0.58 
 After 5 years  -2.10  -1.59  -1.28  -1.11 
 After 10 years  -0.74  -0.83  -0.93  -1.03 
Poland  After 1 year  -0.31  -0.31  -0.34  -0.08 
 After 2 years  -1.60  -1.56  -1.32  -0.42 
 After 5 years  -2.21  -1.56  -1.17  -0.95 
 After 10 years  -1.22  -1.20  -1.21  -1.24 
The shock has a contractionary impact on output in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
but an expansionary impact on output in Poland. This reflects the relative openness of 
the three economies as well as their initial policy settings. The real appreciation of the 
exchange rate has a strong negative impact on the trade balance, while falling interest 
                                                                 
10 According to our baseline projections, these estimates do not imply deflation in any country.   34 
rates and inflation boosts domestic demand. Domestic demand accounts for a much 
larger share of GDP in Poland than in the other economies, and interest rates fall more 
in Poland. Hence there is a much larger impact on demand than elsewhere, and the 
offset from lost competitiveness is not great. The very open Czech and Hungarian 
economies are much more affected by the fall in competitiveness, and its effects on 
the trade balance and output are compounded by the impact of overvaluation on FDI. 
Lower growth and worse competitiveness reduces FDI inflows and this reduces both 
productive capacity and the ability to export. Hence the economies face a period of 
potentially slow growth if they join EMU at overvalued exchange rates, much as 
Barrell and Pain (1999) discuss.  
Table 11.  Impact on GDP Growth 
    Join 2005  Join 2006  Join 2007  Join 2008 
Czech Republic After 1 year  -0.88  -0.81  -0.81  -0.22 
 After 2 years  -2.64  -2.53  -1.98  -0.78 
 After 5 years  -7.42  -5.90  -4.43  -3.03 
 After 10 years  -5.98  -5.41  -5.12  -5.02 
Hungary  After 1 year  -0.21  -0.15  -0.13  0.41 
 After 2 years  -1.41  -1.32  -0.80  0.14 
 After 5 years  -3.46  -2.43  -1.60  -1.00 
 After 10 years  -1.11  -1.09  -1.17  -1.28 
Poland  After 1 year  1.81  1.88  1.96  2.45 
 After 2 years  1.37  1.59  2.16  3.16 
 After 5 years  0.27  1.77  3.10  4.28 
 After 10 years  4.08  5.01  5.71  6.19 
In the very long run in this model there are no irreversibilities, unlike in the Barrell 
and Pain (1999) discussion, and hence output will return to its equilibrium trajectory. 
However, this depends upon competitiveness reaching its equilibrium and then the 
stock of FDI increasing to reach the value it would otherwise have achieved. These 
processes take a long while. The inertial Czech economy could have output below 
where it would have otherwise have been for a long period if it joined EMU in 2005   35 
and there were none of the gains discussed in Pain (2002). The more rapidly reacting 
Hungarian economy might have output below where it would otherwise have been for 
only 10 to 15 years if it joined in 2005 and there are no significant gains from EMU 
membership. Early membership involves a more marked real appreciation on joining, 
and h ence a larger negative impact on output through both trade and technology 
absorption via FDI flows. 
Our results suggest that the Czech Republic and Hungary have something to gain 
from postponing EMU entry until the economies are more fully converged. The 
results for Poland, on the other hand, do not point to significant gains from postponing 
entry. However, Poland, like the Czech Republic and Hungary, may be constrained by 
its excessive budget deficit from achieving early entry. 
V.  Conclusions 
Although we can draw conclusions from the discussion above, it is important to keep 
in mind what is missing from this analysis. We cannot in this analysis take account of 
all shocks, and we cannot fully evaluate the impact of a fixed exchange rate and a 
common currency on growth. However, we can point to other research on these 
topics, such as Barrell and Dury (2000) on the role of shocks in the evaluation of 
regimes, or Frankel and Rose (2002) on the impact of monetary unions on trade and 
growth. The latter paper argues that monetary union can raise trade between members 
by 60 percent of GDP, and this increases competition, specialisation and flows of 
knowledge. As a result in can be argued that in a country with a significant 
productivity gap with its partners output might rise by as much as 20 percent over the 
medium term if it joins a monetary union with them.    36 
The first three sets of simulations lead to appreciations of the real exchange rates in 
most countries. These shocks were chosen specifically because we expect to see a real 
appreciation of the exchange rates in most countries over the next several years. In 
general we find that a flexible regime offers greater stability in the face of these 
shocks, as cyclical behaviour is introduced with a fixed regime. These cycles are 
larger the less flexible the economies, and in particular, the less open and financially 
advanced they are (at least as measured by the stock of financial wealth). This is 
particularly important if shocks cause the nominal exchange rate to move in  the 
opposite direction to the equilibrium, or long term real exchange rate path.  
The appropriate regime depends on the “anticipated” shocks. In general our study 
seems to suggest that a fixed exchange rate regime is preferable in Poland. Poland 
performs better in response to both external demand and supply shocks under a fixed 
regime. Estonia and Hungary are more flexible economies, and there is little trade-off 
between the two regimes in these economies, and hence little to put against the case 
for ultimate membership. For them timing is important. There is some argument in 
favour of a flexible regime in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, particularly where 
external supply shocks are expected. External supply shocks under a fixed regime 
cause the nominal exchange rate to move in the opposite direction to the equilibrium 
real exchange rate path, which requires inflation to overcompensate for the exchange 
rate. In the face of domestic supply shocks, the nominal exchange rate is not pulled in 
the wrong direction by EMU membership, and all economies perform better with a 
fixed regime.  
However, choosing monetary regimes requires an evaluation of the ability of the 
regime to absorb shocks. Regime choices cannot be based purely on results from a   37 
few scenario analyses, as it is important to consider all the shocks that might arise. 
Stochastic simulations have been used for this purpose in studies of the UK in Barrell 
and Dury (2000) and Barrell (2002) suggest that joining EMU reduces inflation and 
price level variability and raises output variability in the UK. The reduction in 
inflation variability stems largely from the removal of exogenous shocks to the €/£ 
exchange rate. Higher risk premia attached to accession countries suggest that the 
potential gains from EMU membership are higher. The results we present in this 
paper can act as a basic guide to the appropriate monetary policy choice in the five 
countries covered by this study. There seems to be some argument for postponing 
membership of EMU in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and perhaps in and 
Hungary until further convergence is achieved.  
Our evidence on the significant costs the Czechs and Hungarians might face if they 
are early joiners would indicate that they should delay membership of EMU until 
several years after they become members of the European Union. However, once the 
process of price level adjustment and increasing productivity is well advanced then 
the case for joining is strong. In the short to medium term membership would imply 
an overvaluation of the exchange rate (partly to ensure the inflation criterion is met) 
that would discourage FDI inflows and hence reduce the rate of growth of technical 
capacity and of exports. These losses would probably be large enough, especially if 
membership came early, to offset the slowly emerging gains from EMU in the early 
years of membership. However, for Poland the case for early fixing and early 
membership is strengthened, as there are no real losses involved, in part because the 
appreciation that would be required would not particularly reduce output through 
reduced FDI, and lower interest rates would stimulate domestic demand.   38 
The choice of regime depends in part on the nature of shocks anticipated in the future 
as well as on the structure of the economies we are studying. If external supply shocks 
were prevalent then the Czechs and the Slovenes would have their case for joining 
weakened unless they were able to make their economies respond more quickly. If 
external demand shocks were prevalent then all countries would have their case for 
membership of EMU strengthened. If internal supply shocks were common then the 
case for membership would be strengthened in all cases but Poland, and they have the 
strongest case anyway on the basis of our results. If internal demand shocks were 
common and unavoidable then independence is probably best unless the gains from 
the use of a common currency are great enough to offset the impact of higher 
volatility. However, shocks are not independent of institutions, and policy makers can 
work to produce a more flexible economic system with small internal shocks. Indeed, 
this is a sensible course of action whether EMU membership is contemplated of not. 
Many internal shocks are generated or at least encouraged by the policy framework, 
and hence it is within the hands of policy makers to change matters, as experience in 
the UK in the last decade has demonstrated.    39 
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